Over the past thirty years the industrialised West has witnessed a move towards space, heterogeneity and subjectivity in the criminological study of violence and homicide. Whilst large-scale quantitative studies of the temporal and spatial distribution of homicide continue to provide a broad empirical context, aetiological explanations tend to be based on analyses of the heterogeneous psychological interactions and experiences of individual subjects at the micro-level. However, mid-range studies of the temporal and spatial distribution of perpetrators and victims of homicide between unrelated adults have provided a useful link between the microand macro-levels. Focusing primarily on British homicide and serial murder, this article attempts to strengthen this link by combining contemporary micro-analyses of the subjective motives of perpetrators with mid-range analyses of space, which can therefore be seen as part of the structural tradition of theorising about homicide and serial murder. Placing these analyses in a broad underlying context constituted by major historical shifts in political economy and the cultural forms of 'pseudo-pacification' and 'special liberty' will lay the initial cornerstones for an integrated multi-level theory.
3 criminology and sociology since Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) combination of strain, differential association and sub-cultural theories, have produced some very interesting hybrids with potential for further development (see Akers and Sellers, 2004) . However, this potential is hampered by the lack of reliable empirical data on all three levels of analysis and the difficulty of constructing concepts that are able to integrate these levels. These concepts are often ontologically specific to each level and the distinct philosophies and politics that underlie each traditional theory (see Hall, ibid.) .
Although violence is a broad and slippery concept, empirical studies of homicide are useful as a foundation for theoretical integration. Homicide is one of the fundamental 'consensual crimes' around which hard-line social constructionist explanations collapse to reveal a firmer object for empirical and theoretical attention. The vast majority of homicidal acts are discovered and recorded, thus statistical representations are more reliable than those that represent general crime and violence, which are more susceptible to variations in socially constructed definitions and irredeemably debased by a large estimated 'dark figure' of unreported and unrecorded incidents (Brookman, 2005; D'Cruze et al, 2006) . Legal and cultural definitions of homicide are very similar across the nations and regions of the industrialised West, therefore cross-cultural and temporal comparisons of statistical rates can be made with more confidence (Barclay et al, 2003) . However, despite the opportunities these relatively reliable data present, outside psychology the aetiological study of homicide nonetheless suffers from 'academic neglect' (Brookman, 2005: 1) . As a consequence, questions related to explaining what motivates one human being to kill another human being are seldom considered in their socioeconomic contexts within academic criminology or sociology, despite the popular fascination that this type of question generates. Brookman's observation is perhaps even more apt when we consider the relative dearth of academic interest in the phenomenon of serial murder in its socioeconomic contexts (for interesting psychologically-based explorations see : Beasley, 2004; Burgess, Hartman, Ressler, Douglas & McCormack, 1986; Hickey, 2006; Meloy, 2000; Myers, Gooch, & Meloy, 2005; Stone, 2001) . We employ throughout this article the standard academic and European definition of 'serial murder' as the killing of three or more victims within a period of greater than 30 days (Wilson, 2007) and continue Grover and Soothill's (1999) and Wilson's (2007; attempts to adopt a structural, as opposed to a relentless medicopsychological approach, to this phenomenon.
Previous empirical studies of homicide rates have produced reasonably reliable data on two of the three levels of analysis, the macro and the meso. In European studies the most common representation at the macro-level is the palpable decline in homicide rates that Western Europe experienced throughout the early-modern and modern eras (see Eisner, 2011 for a statistical breakdown). Similar but more undulating declines can also be discerned in the United States of America on a more compressed time-scale from the mid-nineteenth century (see Roth, 2009; Hall and McLean, 2009) . Underneath this empirical phenomenon is a complex array of shifting social relations, forms of political economy and cultural norms and values.
We know that fluctuations in statistical homicide rates tend to coexist at specific points in time and space (Currie, 2009) . Higher than average rates are found in spatial regions and locales that can be distinguished by their marginal positions in the socioeconomic structure.
These positions have changed over time, and the variations follow a discernible pattern (see Hall and McLean, 2009; Marktanner and Noiset, 2013) . For instance, there is little doubt that 5 since the 1970s, geographical spaces in the deindustrialised regions of Europe and the USA that have returned significantly higher rates of homicide have also suffered from economic disruption, increased unemployment, ethnic tensions, loss of credible political representation, a decline in cultural status, damage inflicted on vital social institutions such as family, housing and education and the growth of criminal markets (Dorling, 2004; Reiner, 2007; Parker, 2008) .
However, we still do not know enough about subjective motivations and whether or not they, rather than the opportunities to commit homicide, also vary over time. This is a crucial distinction because the theoretical and political polarity it implies is quite extreme. To suggest that only opportunities vary and there will always be a small number of killers 'out there' waiting to pounce on victims unless intrusive systems of security and protection are rigorously and indefinitely maintained buys into classical liberal and conservative fatalism.
Conversely, to suggest that the propensity to kill, and by extension human nature itself, varies over time and space fits with a more optimistic liberal principle of a flexible human nature whose underlying benign orientation to others can be brought to the fore by creating and maintaining more equal and less aggressive underlying socioeconomic and cultural conditions. The difference in the political and policy programmes of general violence reduction suggested by either of these positions is polarised and qualitatively different; increased security and control over an innately errant human nature in a society determined by market forces versus some degree of progressive political intervention in underlying socioeconomic and cultural conditions.
If this crucial question is to be answered, criminology must further its understanding of the subjective micro-level to the extent that it can recognise patterns in the rather daunting 6 variety of motivations and justifications that permeate this level, and begin to integrate these patterns more firmly with those already known to constitute the spatial/temporal meso-level and broad historical and structural macro-level. This article will argue that a firm focus on the victim, the victim's socio-cultural relation to the killer and the spaces in which homicide between unrelated adults tends to be committed presents us with a potentially fruitful approach to an integrated theory.
We will focus down further on serial killing, which, although an extreme and relatively rare form of homicide, can reveal specific subjective motivations and underlying cultural currents that are known to be associated with other forms of homicide in Europe and the USA (Wilson, 2007; Stein, 2007) . Our overall aim is to make a tentative move towards the construction of a provisional and probabilistic analytical nexus that connects the subjective, spatial and broad structural levels, in the hope that it can inform integrated theory construction in the future. By introducing to the debate the new concepts of pseudopacification and special liberty (see Hall, 2012 ), which we fully define later, we also hope to propose a very basic outline of what we regard as the fundamental form of cultural mediation that pervades all liberal societies. These concepts will help to establish firmer and more plausible connections between the three analytical levels.
The macro-level: structure, politics and culture
In Western Europe and the USA there is a long tradition of social scientific macro-analyses of homicide that operate on the broad structural and temporal level. Western Europe seems to be characterised by a long-term decline in rates of homicide, which, depending upon the 7 specific region, commenced from various points between the 14 th and 16 th century and stretched to the mid-20 th century (Eisner, 2011) , from which point there have been undulating rises in most nations (Hall and McLean, 2009 ). The US homicide rate, however, has fluctuated in a more spectacular fashion in a condensed time period since the mid-19 th century when reliable data began to be collected, and regional and local differences have tended to be greater (Roth, 2009 ; see also Monkonnen, 1989; 2001) .
Two very salient theoretical propositions emerge from Roth's (ibid.) broad but regionally differentiated analysis of homicide in the USA, both of which echo Verkko's (1951) classic observations in Europe. Firstly, whereas the rate of intimate homicide tends to be relatively consistent, temporal and spatial fluctuations in the rate of homicide between unrelated adults are significantly more pronounced, and thus seem to present us with a broad empirical framework for theorising significant changes in underlying probabilistic circumstances.
Secondly, when all regional differentiations and complications are taken into account, four major forms of broad cultural mediation, which seem to link external circumstances at the macro-level to individuals' interior subjective feelings, motivations and violent actions, correlate with reduced rates of homicide between unrelated adults:
1. The general belief that government is stable, legitimate, representative and capable of protecting the person.
2. An acceptable degree of trust in the individuals who run government and public services.
3. The broad existence of empathy arising from social and political solidarity.
4. The belief that one's position in society is satisfactory, and one can command respect without resorting to violence. This cultural framework relates to Elias's (1994) per cent of homicides occur in locales of socioeconomic disadvantage, and many are associated with some form of economic crime (Hall and McLean, 2009; Marktanner and Noiset, 2013) . We suggest that Roth set up a straw target that ignores Durkheim's and Merton's warning that there are no simple economic 'cures' for crime if 'economy' is expressed in such crude material terms (see Hall, 2012 ). It is not the level of material production but the relative equality of socioeconomic relations -signified not simply by a more even distribution of material products and economic opportunities but also by social solidarity and equality of political participation and cultural status -that should be considered 9 as the main macro-factor associated with lower rates of crime and violence (Ray, 2011) .
Without this, political legitimacy, social stability and interpersonal empathy are less likely, especially in conditions of extreme inequality (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010; Currie, 1985) . (Currie, 1985) . Since the mid-1990s the general crime and homicide rates have been returned closer to those of the social democratic period, but this has been achieved only in the midst of a significant increase in imprisonment rates and supervisory programmes, and huge investments in the therapeutic state -significant numbers of young people inappropriately prescribed Ritalin, Prozac or atypical anti-psychotics (Breggin, 2012) -and in the surveillance and securitisation of public space (Coleman and McCahill, 2011) . In the social democratic era, these intrusive pacifying measures were far less prominent yet homicide and overall crime rates were significantly reduced. This reduction occurred as the traditional political struggles that characterised this era temporarily established increased socioeconomic equality, political participation, full employment and publicly-funded welfare, health and education systems. Homicide rates also tend to vary across nations, regions and locales that differ in their ability to counteract the cultural factor of intense interpersonal competition with an alternative culture of empathy and solidarity, one of the main reasons 'why some places are more dangerous than others' (Currie, 2009: 4) . Nations that have undergone rapid transitions to neoliberal market economies, which caused socioeconomic instability, widening inequality and the intensification of competitive individualism, such as post-Soviet Russia and the 11 former Soviet satellite states of Eastern Europe in the 1990s, have also experienced notable increases in crime, homicide and imprisonment rates (Lafree and Tseloni, 2006; Volkov, 1999; Gerber and Hout, 1998 Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 1980; Blau and Blau, 1982; Dorling, 2004; Reiner, 2007; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010; Ray, 2011; Wilson, 2007; Hall and McLean, 2009; Marktanner and Noiset, 2013) . The upshot of this macro-level position is that in periods and spaces where citizens feel poorly represented by their governments and Currie's six conditions also apply, overall rates of homicide, particularly rates of homicide between unrelated adults, are significantly higher. This schema is more expansive, more contextualised and has more sociological depth than Roth's four cultural macro-variable and Elias's three sociopolitical macro-variables. However, other Western nations suffer from socioeconomic instability and spatially distributed inequality and have easy access to firearms, yet they maintain relatively low homicide and imprisonment rates (see Hall and McLean, 2009) . To begin to solve this problem we must return to Currie's earlier work (1985; , where he suggests that the USA's more intense culture of competitive individualism might be the crucial factor that 12 makes simultaneous contributions to its relatively high homicide rate by normalising aggressive human interaction, and to the reproduction of the probabilistic contexts in which this higher rate tends to appear.
Theorists who have attempted to provide simple socio-structural explanations of violence and homicide have been unconvincing. For instance, Connell (1995) points out the fact that public violence tends to be committed by men, and goes on to explain male violence in economically run-down locales as a product of 'protest masculinity', the physical expression of frustrated and inarticulate dissent against the forces that have created political and socioeconomic exclusion. This is simply the uncritical application of the paradigmatic idea put forward by Taylor et al (1973) that violent crime is a misguided form of proto-political dissent. Elliot Leyton (1986) It is rare that a sociological analysis is diametrically opposed to the truth. However, recent work by philosophers and social theorists suggests that most acts of serious violence, homicide and serial killing are not misguided proto-political protests but born of conformity to capitalism's 'obscene Real', a term that means the system's functionally active yet systematically disavowed exploitative, predatory and violent drives (see Žižek, 2008; Hall et al, 2008; Hall, 2012) . However, even when the possibility of conformity is acknowledged, it is difficult to see this type of illegitimate violence as part of a general 'hegemonic' strategy that functions to maintain a hierarchal social order. Connell (ibid.) points out that systemic violence permeates the current social order, but links the bottom to the top by focusing on the intersecting gender order; all men, she argues, benefit from the 'patriarchal dividend' because the violence they use to maintain dominant positions over women and less aggressive men at various points in the social order is legitimised by patriarchal culture. However, although this can have some purchase as an explanation of domestic violence and other forms of male violence in private spheres, it makes little sense in the public sphere. Firstly, traditional male culture systematically discredits those who inflict violence on more vulnerable individuals (Jefferson, 2002) . Secondly, only a minority of men commit acts of serious violence in the public sphere and, thirdly, in largely pacified Western societies, physical violence is ineffective as both a localised and an overall dominance strategy (Hall, 2002 (Wilson, 2007: 55) . However, despite these distinguishing factors, there is an interesting structural homology between victims of homicide between unrelated adults and victims of serial murderers -they tend to be vulnerable, from excluded populations and relatively unprotected.
Weiviorka's (2012) claim that we should take the victim perspective more seriously rings true, because it can inform theories of motivation by identifying patterns of offending and illuminating the subjectivities involved in victim-offender relations. Here, the victim's marginalised social position can be brought into clearer relief by relating it to the cultural macro-factor of competitive individualism (Currie, 1985; . Social inequality is the product of a system constituted by various social axes of domination, but, in a liberaldemocratic system, even though that inequality can be reproduced over time by the inherited 15 privilege that restricts social mobility, the system is relatively open. The configuration of winners and losers and the spaces they inhabit are the outcomes of an ongoing competitive struggle (Winlow and Hall, 2006; Hall, 2012) . If the vulnerable victims of homicide between unrelated adults and methodical predatory killing consistently occupy the position of 'the loser' in this competitive struggle, we need to understand its forms and relations in finer analytical detail. pseudo-pacification and special liberty will help to explain this tension and further our understanding of the vital cultural macro-variables that attend the socioeconomic and political macro-variables outlined above. The pseudo-pacification process has been explicated in fine detail elsewhere (Hall, 2007; , but here a brief summary will provide some important contextualisation for the long-term empirical decline in homicide that has been a consistent feature of Western Europe.
European Feudal societies were structured by 'righteous violence' (Maddern, 1992) , the everyday use of which, in the forms of fatal or seriously injurious punishment or armed assaults, was restricted to the ruling elite. In England, political and economic systems were destabilised after the fall of Rome and again after the Norman invasion. In the aftermath of both disruptive periods systems of monopolisation and legitimisation broke down and the Thus pseudo-pacified behaviour did not establish itself for the sake of some civilizational ideal, nor in the name of some transcendental love of peace and resistance against domination, but to perform the dual function of protecting property rights to enhance trade and creating a pacified form of social competition that fuelled consumer culture and increased demand in burgeoning markets. Over the course of modernity, competitive individualism, shorn of legitimate physical violence yet still aggressive and hierarchal in a more fluid social structure, could be brought to the centre of the socioeconomic system as a dominant cultural norm and dynamic drive. This was not a 'civilizing process', nor even a pacification process, but a pseudo-pacification process established and reproduced as the cultural fuel for economic dynamism. As such, it rendered the pseudo-pacified subject and its non-violent relations with others in a state of tension, over-dependent for its complicity with civilising norms and laws and the constant expansion of opportunities for wealth, expressive hedonism and the achievement of social status by means of conspicuous consumption.
The aristocratic love of libidinal liberty and conspicuous displays of superior status, which Veblen (1994) noticed still alive and well amongst successful entrepreneurs in the late-19 th 'gilded age' in the USA and Europe, were diffused and democratised in a competitive socially-mobile entrepreneurial economy and a consumer culture of 'affordable luxury'.
However, successful entrepreneurs also carried forward the aristocratic sense of privilege and supremacism in a modified cultural form now associated with their commercial activities, which can be captured in the term special liberty (see Hall, 2012) . This is a master signifier that legitimises and justifies wealth-creating and expressive activities that often risk harm to others, and establishes a culture of Rousseauean amour propre, in which the individual understands his social status only in relation to the downfall of others (Hall et al, 2008) .
Although law does not necessarily legitimise the exploitation, negligence, lack of health and safety, environmental degradation, social disruption and so on caused by competitive business enterprise, the constant difficulty law faces in convicting business owners and managers constitutes a 'crisis of enforcement ' (Tombs and Whyte, 2008) . Special liberty is a condensation of the dark side of liberal individualism (see Fish, 2010) , the conviction that the individual, once his high moral and functional importance is established in his own mind, is exempt from social responsibility and can do what he or she wants, even when the gratification of material or expressive interests risks harm to others.
Pseudo-pacification and special liberty together constitute the powerful and historically specific libertarian macro-cultural current that underlies modernity and capitalism. In this current extreme forms of negative freedom (rights) have been institutionalised and democratised to allow extreme forms of positive freedom (desires) to flourish and fuel consumer markets. The resulting dynamism is economically potent yet psychologically, culturally and socially unstable, and therefore requires sophisticated and intrusive forms of external securitisation to keep its restless forces in check (Hall, 2012; see also Crogan, 2010 ).
An understanding of this cultural current allows us to understand the complex dynamics that constitute and energise the Western form of competitive individualism and make another important macro-correlation. Namely, that Western nations, regions and locales in which this 19 macro-cultural current is especially powerful, opportunities for expressive hedonism and social advancement are relatively sparse, and in which mechanisms of informal control and formal securitisation and protection are under constant strain -such as the USA and Russia in the neoliberal era -suffer from high rates of homicide and spates of serial killing (Wilson, 2007; Holmes and DeBurger, 1988; Holmes and Holmes, 1994; Fox and Levin, 2005) .
The meso-level: locale and situation
To develop these macro-level correlations, processes and concepts into a tentative multi-level theory of causation they must be connected to the meso-and micro-levels. and early 1990s, was unevenly distributed across space. Across the West relatively poor, rundown deindustrialised zones continued to return homicide rates consistently higher than the national average (see Dorling, 2004; Reiner, 2007) .
In economically unstable and culturally competitive neoliberal economies the macrovariables, outlined above, which are essential to the maintenance of non-violent interpersonal relations, are all eroded at the macro-social level (Hall, 2007; Wilson, 2007) . However, this erosion can be extreme in specific run-down regions and locales. An analysis of the 20 autotomic production of space (Atkinson and Parker, 2011) can help to connect macrovariables to the micro-variables that relate to both homicide and serial killing.
One-off killers, serial killers and those who commit various acts of serious violence that incur substantial penalties all want to avoid the consequences of detection. The deterrent effect of the public gaze -whether the conduit is technological surveillance, the presence of police and security staff or simply the presence of other people -can to some extent reduce acts of murder, serious violence and altercations or risky activities that can lead to manslaughter and other forms of accidental death (Hobbs et al, 2003) . However, serial killers, driven to act out extreme forms of hatred and rage, which, as we will explore in detail later, are the products of their biographical experiences (Bollas, 1995; Stein, 2007) , do not want fully and permanently to gratify their drives and desires because that would allow them to become satiated. Rather, they want to retain the chance of acting them out as many times as possible in the future.
Although we would support the claim that homicide in private spaces, such as the domestic household, requires its own specialised research agenda, a common function shared by the private and public space can still be discerned. Namely, that specific types of public space, like all private spaces, are conducive to the prolonged concealment of acts of violence.
All killers operate in three major spaces. While rates of intimate homicide in private spaces tend to be consistent (Roth, 2009) , interesting temporal and spatial variations can be found in rates of homicide between unrelated adults in the two other forms of public space: the liminal space, in which the killer can find victims and 'hide in the light'; and what Papastergiadis and Rogers (1996) call the parafunctional space, which provides both victims and prolonged concealment. While some urban spaces are vibrant (see Campbell, 2012) , parafunctional space is 'dead space', which no longer performs its appropriate function. However, the 21 important commonality is that these two spaces represent the opposite of discipline (Hayward, 2012) . A large proportion of urban economic and political activity is simply an effort to prevent spaces becoming parafunctional, or perhaps whole urban areas becoming 'ghost towns', a fate that threatens large sectors of once major commercial and manufacturing cities such as Detroit in the USA or Liverpool in the UK. Hayward (ibid.) is correct that more control and surveillance cannot bring parafunctional spaces back to life, but more pertinent here are the processes that create and reproduce these spaces. Atkinson and Parker refer to the autotomic production of space as:
[T]he social, political and economic processes through which the costs of maintaining 'unruly' space and state and civil exposure to risk bearing agents are mitigated through spatial abandonment and rejection. Prominent examples of such spatial practices include policing 'no-go' areas (high crime and social disorder zones), urban wastelands, derelict buildings, public transport 'misery lines' and those spaces tacitly understood to be under informal curfew (2011: 2).
For Atkinson and Parker, the state and private sector together construct these spaces by practices of social division and expulsion but, more importantly, the mode of control is managed through the primary practice of disengagement and the concomitant preferential protection of the more salubrious spaces inhabited by higher income groups. This formulation presents an alternative to the largely obsolete 'panopticon' and 'net-widening' discourses that still remain popular in criminology. Control is exerted preferentially, which leaves the autotomic space amputated from the social body, unattended and unprotected, a shadowworld in which unseen and unregulated activities can take place. The irony is that this autotomic method of control exacerbates the problem of the uncontrollable space; it is a violence is normalised. Because the victims were not prostitutes and therefore lacked a common identity that could be used as a hook, the police and the media were slow to make connections between the murders and therefore the killer was allowed to prolong his concealment.
For over four decades criminology has been focused on the media's sensationalism and concomitant exaggeration of crime rates. Yet Hardy's case is one amongst a number of British serial murders -such as those committed by Kenneth Erskine, Peter Moore and Mark
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Martin -homicides and assaults in hybrid parafunctional/liminal zones that are consistently ignored by the media. Even the more spectacular of these incidents are only briefly mentioned in local news and rarely filter through to the national level, which would suggest that such violence is constantly understated in the public eye. Wilson (2007; points to a vital aspect of the overall multi-level process: hybrid parafunctional/liminal spaces, the mesolevel products of political, economic and cultural macro-forces operating at the macro-level, are public locations where violence and homicide are normalised and predators, products of individual experiences at the micro-level, can meet vulnerable victims whilst drawing minimal attention to themselves and their acts of violence.
Integrating the micro-level: subjectivity in context
Homicide between unrelated adults in public spaces, despite the disproportionate harm and fear it causes, is still very much a minority pursuit (Hall, 2012) . The tendencies that seem to exist amid our probabilistic conditions are built upon relatively small numbers of incidents.
Although many individuals experience difficult lives in dysfunctional or abusive families and impoverished socioeconomic environments, only a small proportion of these individuals commit acts of homicide. No move towards an integrated theoretical framework is therefore possible unless the complex issue of subjectivity and its relation to violence and homicide is unpacked. The sociologist Michel Weiviorka (2009) has performed a valuable service to this integrative project by analysing decades of empirical and theoretical work to provide social science with a preliminary typology of the forms of violent subjectivity that operate in various micro-spaces. The following motivations and justifications seem to crop up consistently as ideal-types across the broad spectrum of violent acts, especially homicide:
1. hypersubjectivity, the product of an overload or a plethora of meanings 2. desubjectivated non-subjectivity capable of surrender to the banality of evil 3. socially liberated antisubjectivity orientated to cruelty, sadism and violence as ends in themselves 4. subjectivity aimed at conserving its being or its foundation
This typology bears some resemblance to the standard but contested psychological typology often used to explain serial killers and other types of methodical killer: visionary, mission, hedonistic/sadistic, power/control (Wilson, 2007; Holmes and DeBurger, 1988 ) insofar as they also revolve around the basic desires to establish meaning, destroy meaning or unleash aggressive/sexual libidinal drives without restraint. Bollas (1995) , Stein (2007) and Dews (2008) argue that these motivations and justifications for violence have common roots in an absence of trust in the outside world and a loss of empathy felt toward the individuals who populate it, usually the result of severe traumas experienced in the early years of abusive and/or negligent childhoods. However, Stein's (ibid.) research amongst violent prison inmates suggests that the difference between the subjective motivations behind harmful crime, non-fatal violence, fatal violence and methodical fatal violence could be a matter of scale rather than qualitative difference (see also White, 2004) . Despite nuances that differentiate various subjectivities and situations, the willingness of, say, the state functionary or corporate criminal to act in ways that risk harm to others in order to gratify material or expressive interests is the same fundamental motivation that drives the methodical killer (Hall, 2012) .
26
Therefore, what at first glance looks like an impossibly diverse disarray of idiosyncratic subjective motivations does, it seems to us, have some rough underlying shape. Of course subjective motivations and justifications are still pluralistic and complex, and thus extremely difficult to research. Conceptual difficulties are compounded by methodological difficulties such as the inability or reluctance of killers and serial killers to articulate and disclose personal motivations and justifications (Wilson, 2007) . However, if we hold on to the epistemological lifeline thrown to us by the basic but still quite useful adumbrated typology outlined above, we might be able to at least begin to connect the predominant subjective forms it identifies with the meso-and macro-levels.
It is well-known that most killers and perpetrators of serious violence have deeply disturbed personal backgrounds. Stein's (2007) research with prisoners shows that over 80 per cent of the prison inmates who had been convicted of fatal and non-fatal violent offences disclosed some degree of neglect and/or abuse during early childhood. Dews (2008) and Bollas (1995) argue that the young child's experience of abuse and neglect from primary care-givers induces a trauma that results in a complete breakdown of trust at the micro-level. Winlow and Hall's (2009) others with a compulsion that borders on paranoia, he constantly seeks to incite shadowevents -in the vernacular, the individual 'looks for trouble' -in order to release the impotent rage that was produced by his inability to act against the initial, formative acts of abuse committed against the self (see also Winlow, 2012) . Similarly, Stein (ibid.) proposes a scalar model of violent dispositions, which suggests that when the initial trauma is extreme and/or 27 protracted it produces a dissociated self which simply seeks to by-pass cognition and moral codes to constantly act out the rage that has been inculcated at its neurological core.
The biographical and psychological process that produces trauma and violent dispositions resonates with Roth's work on the decline of trust at the macro-social and macro-political level, a relationship that is so directly analogous that it has often been missed in mainstream analysis, which tends to depict killers as aberrations, departures from the norm. However Western nations' centuries of domination. This is an individual born of the untrammelled will-to-power, whose life is a quest to circumvent the symbolic order's prohibitions in the quest for special liberty, the conviction that one is entitled to act out all pressing drives and desires, no matter how extreme, antagonistic and potentially harmful they might be (Hall, 2012) .
The upshot of this set of theories is that the serial killer cuts through everyday hypocrisy to act out a pure manifestation of the pre-symbolic human drives -envy, fear, prejudice, hatred, sadism, hedonistic pleasure -that fuel the systemic violence of the socioeconomic system and its attendant culture of special liberty. Thus it is an extreme scalar form of normality, the hyper-normal, more perfectly in tune with the system's hidden obscene drives of violence, negligence and exploitation, which are fetishistically disavowed in public life yet experienced by the serial killer first-hand in early life. As the extreme point on the typographical scale of killers, the serial killer, alongside the more spectacularly brutal one-off killers and spree killers, are all individualised and portrayed as unique aberrations, abnormalities in an otherwise benign system populated by morally upright citizens. Yet all of us, as citizens, as Žižek (2008; 2010) reminds us, pursue our livelihoods and our security on the back of the most horrific acts of organised military violence, the disruption of settled economic structures, the systematic exploitation of relatively powerless and vulnerable individuals in industrial processes and the negligence of those whose who are no longer required.
This extreme 'abnormal' figure, as presented by the media, performs the important dual function of distracting attention away from systemic violence and absolving everyday people of any blame they might feel over their role in perpetuating it (Žižek, 2008; Taylor, 2010) . In this general discourse the serial killer is distinguished from the one-off killer -and, at a far greater distance, from the everyday individual -only by the unusual strength of the dual drive. This drive seeks, firstly, to act out personal hatred of a dismembered and abusive social collective with which he cannot identify. Secondly, it seeks to act out its hyper-conformity with the system's exploitative core drives, which are unleashed by an over-identification with the elite cultural value of special liberty that allows the individual to transcend the normative restrictions set by the pseudo-pacification process. The relatively rare occasions when serial killers are women, who in a traditionally sexist culture occupy a symbolic position of passivity, can be portrayed as even more aberrant and thus present the media with enhanced opportunities for ideological distraction and absolution.
Conclusion
At the moment the formal and aetiological connections between the three analytical levels we have outlined still remain too tenuous and speculative. To make further progress criminology must embark on a research programme to produce further empirical evidence at all levels and tighten up provisional theoretical concepts with the ambition of constructing a coherent theoretical framework. This is especially true of criminology's current (lack of) theorising related to serial murder in its political, socioeconomic and cultural contexts. However, previous research and theoretical works within a structural tradition have produced initial ideas that are taking shape in the murk that confronts us.
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